We study the secure lossy transmission of a vector Gaussian source to a legitimate user in the presence of an eavesdropper, where both the legitimate user and the eavesdropper have vector Gaussian side information. The aim of the transmitter is to describe the source to the legitimate user in a way that the legitimate user can reconstruct the source within a certain distortion level while the eavesdropper is kept ignorant of the source as much as possible as measured by the equivocation. We obtain an outer bound for the rate, equivocation and distortion region of this secure lossy transmission problem. This outer bound is tight when the transmission rate constraint is removed. In other words, we obtain the maximum equivocation at the eavesdropper when the legitimate user needs to reconstruct the source within a fixed distortion level while there is no constraint on the transmission rate. This characterization of the maximum equivocation involves two auxiliary random variables. We show that a nontrivial selection for both random variables may be necessary in general. The necessity of two auxiliary random variables also implies that, in general, Wyner-Ziv coding is suboptimal in the presence of an eavesdropper. In addition, we show that, even when there is no rate constraint on the legitimate link, uncoded transmission (deterministic or stochastic) is suboptimal; the presence of an eavesdropper necessitates the use of a coded scheme to attain the maximum equivocation.
source coding problem is studied in [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] . The common theme of these works is that the legitimate receiver wants to reconstruct the source in a lossless fashion by using the information it gets from the transmitter in conjunction with its side information, while the eavesdropper is being kept ignorant of the source as much as possible. Secure lossy source coding problem is studied in [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] . In these works, unlike the ones focusing on secure lossless source coding, the legitimate receiver does not want to reconstruct the source in a lossless fashion, but within a distortion level.
The most relevant works to our work here are [15] , [16] . In [15] , the author considers the secure lossy transmission of a source over a degraded wiretap channel while both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper have side information about the source. In [15] , in addition to the degradedness that the wiretap channel exhibits, the source and side information also have a degradedness structure such that given the legitimate user's side information, the source and the eavesdropper's side information are independent. For this setting, in [15] , a single-letter characterization of the distortion and equivocation region is provided. In particular, the optimality of a separationbased approach, i.e., the optimality of a code that concatenates a rate-distortion code and a wiretap channel code, is shown. In [16] , the setting of [15] is partially generalized such that in [16] , the source and side information do not have any degradedness structure. On the other hand, as opposed to the noisy wiretap channel of [15] , in [16] , the channel between the transmitter and receivers is assumed to be noiseless. For this setting, in [16] , a single-letter characterization of the rate, equivocation, and distortion region is provided.
Here, we consider the setting of [16] for jointly Gaussian source and side information. In particular, we consider the model where the transmitter has a vector Gaussian source which is jointly Gaussian with the vector Gaussian side information of both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. In this model, the transmitter wants to convey information to the legitimate user in a way that the legitimate user can reconstruct the source within a distortion level while the eavesdropper is being kept ignorant of the source as much as possible as measured by the equivocation. A single-letter characterization of the rate, equivocation, and distortion region for this setting exists due to [16] . Although we are unable to evaluate this single-letter characterization for the vector Gaussian source and side information case to obtain the corresponding rate, equivocation, distortion region explicitly, we obtain an outer bound for this region. We obtain this outer bound by optimizing the rate and equivocation constraints separately. We note that a joint optimization of the rate and equivocation constraints for a fixed distortion level would yield the exact achievable rate 0018-9448 © 2013 IEEE and equivocation region for this fixed distortion level. Thus, optimizing the rate and equivocation constraints separately yields a larger region, i.e., an outer bound. We show that this outer bound is tight when we remove the rate constraint at the transmitter. In other words, we obtain the maximum achievable equivocation at the eavesdropper when the legitimate user needs to reconstruct the vector Gaussian source within a fixed distortion while there is no constraint on the transmission rate.
We note some implications of this result. First, we note that since there is no rate constraint on the transmitter, it can use an uncoded scheme to describe the source to the legitimate user, and, indeed, it can use any instantaneous (deterministic or stochastic) encoding scheme for this purpose. However, we show through an example that even when there is no rate constraint on the transmitter, to attain the maximum equivocation at the eavesdropper, in general, the transmitter needs to use a coded scheme. Hence, the presence of an eavesdropper necessitates the use of a coded scheme even in the absence of a rate constraint on the transmitter. Second, we note that the maximum equivocation expression has two different covariance matrices originating from the presence of two auxiliary random variables in the single-letter expression. We show through another example that both of these covariance matrices, in other words, both of these two auxiliary random variables, are needed in general to attain the maximum equivocation at the eavesdropper. The necessity of two covariance matrices, and hence two auxiliary random variables, implies that, in general, Wyner-Ziv coding scheme [17] is not sufficient to attain the maximum equivocation at the eavesdropper.
II. SECURE LOSSY SOURCE CODING
Here, we describe the secure lossy source coding problem (see Fig. 1 ) and state the existing results. Let denote i.i.d. tuples drawn from a distribution . The transmitter, the legitimate user, and the eavesdropper observe and , respectively. The transmitter wants to convey information to the legitimate user in a way that the legitimate user can reconstruct the source within a certain distortion, and meanwhile the eavesdropper is kept ignorant of the source as much as possible as measured by the equivocation. We note that if there was no eavesdropper, this setting would reduce to the Wyner-Ziv problem [17] , for which a single-letter characterization for the minimum transmission rate of the transmitter for each distortion level exists.
The distortion of the reconstructed sequence at the legitimate user is measured by the function where denotes the legitimate user's reconstruction of the source . We consider the function that has the following form: (1) where is a nonnegative finite-valued function. The confusion of the eavesdropper is measured by the following equivocation term:
where , which is a function of the source , denotes the signal sent by the transmitter.
An code for secure lossy source coding consists of an encoding function at the transmitter and a decoding function at the legitimate user . A rate, equivocation, and distortion tuple is achievable if there exists an code satisfying
The set of all achievable tuples is denoted by which is given by the following theorem. 
for some satisfying the following Markov chain: (8) and a function . The achievable scheme that attains the region has the same spirit as the Wyner-Ziv scheme [17] in the sense that both achievable schemes use binning to exploit the side information at the legitimate user, and consequently, to reduce the rate requirement. The difference of the achievable scheme that attains comes from the additional binning necessitated by the presence of an eavesdropper. In particular, the transmitter generates sequences and bins both sequences. The transmitter sends these two bin indices. Using these bin indices, the legitimate user identifies the right sequences, and reconstructs within the required distortion. On the other hand, using the bin indices of , the eavesdropper identifies only the right sequence, and consequently, does not contribute to the equivocation, see (6) 1 . Indeed, this achievable scheme can be viewed as if it is using a rate-splitting technique to send the message , since has two coordinates, one for 1 The fact that the eavesdropper can decode sequence can be obtained by observing that for a selection, if , there is no loss of optimality of setting which will yield a larger region.
the bin index of , and one for the bin index of . This perspective reveals the similarity of the achievable scheme that attains and the one that attains the capacity-equivocation region of the wiretap channel [2] where also rate-splitting is used. In particular, in the latter case, the message is divided into two parts such that is sent by the sequence and is sent by the sequence . The eavesdropper decodes whereas the other message contributes to the secrecy. We note that Theorem 1 holds for continuous by replacing the discrete entropy term with the differential entropy term . To avoid the negative equivocation that might arise because of the use of differential entropy, we replace equivocation with the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper defined by (9) Once we are interested in the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper, a rate, mutual information leakage, and distortion tuple is said to be achievable if there exists an code such that (10)
The set of all achievable tuples is denoted by . Using Theorem 1, the region can be stated as follows.
Theorem 2 ( [16] ): iff
for some satisfying the following Markov chain: (15) and a function .
III. VECTOR GAUSSIAN SOURCES
Now we study the secure lossy source coding problem for jointly Gaussian (see Fig. 2 ) where the tuples are independent across time, i.e., across the index , and each tuple is drawn from the same jointly Gaussian distribution . In other words, we consider the case where is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix 2 and the side information at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper are jointly Gaussian with the source . In particular, we assume that have the following form:
2 means that the difference between the matrices and , i.e., , is strictly positive definite; and means that the difference between the matrices and , i.e., , is positive semidefinite. where and are independent zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices and , respectively, and and are independent. We note that the side information given by (16)- (17) are not in the most general form. In the most general case, we have
for some matrices. However, until Section V, we consider the form of side information given by (16)- (17) , and obtain our results for this model. In Section V, we generalize our results to the most general case given by (18)- (19) . We note that since the rate, information leakage, and distortion region is invariant with respect to the correlation between and , the correlation between and is immaterial. The distortion of the reconstructed sequence is measured by the mean square error matrix (20) Hence, the distortion constraint is represented by a positive semidefinite matrix , which is achievable if there is an code such that (21) Throughout the paper, we assume that where is the conditional covariance matrix of conditioned on : (22) Since the mean square error is minimized by the minimum mean square error (MMSE) estimator which is given by the conditional mean, we assume that the legitimate user applies this optimal estimator, i.e., the legitimate user selects its reconstruction function as (23) Once the estimator of the legitimate user is set as (23), using Theorem 2, a single-letter description of the region for a vector Gaussian source can be given as follows.
Theorem 3: iff
for some satisfying the following Markov chain:
We also define the region as the union of the pairs that are achievable when the distortion constraint matrix is set to . Our main result is an outer bound for the region , hence for the region . 
and . We will prove Theorem 4 in Section IV. In the remainder of this section, we provide interpretations and discuss some implications of Theorem 4.
The outer bound in Theorem 4 is obtained by minimizing the constraints on and individually, i.e., the rate lower bound in (29) is obtained by minimizing the rate constraint in (24) and the mutual information leakage lower bound in (30) is obtained by minimizing the mutual information leakage constraint in (25) separately. However, to characterize the rate and mutual information leakage region , one needs to minimize the rate constraint in (24) and the mutual leakage information constraint in (25) jointly, not separately. In particular, since the region is convex in the pairs as per a time-sharing argument, joint optimization of the rate constraint in (24) and the mutual information leakage constraint in (25) can be carried out by considering the tangent lines to the region , i.e., by solving the following optimization problem:
for all values of , where . As of now, we have been unable to solve the optimization problem for all values of . However, as stated in Theorem 4, we solve the optimization problems and by showing the optimality of jointly Gaussian to evaluate the corresponding cost functions. In other words, our outer bound in Theorem 4 can be written as follows:
We note that the constraint in (29), and hence , gives us the Wyner-Ziv rate distortion function [17] for the vector Gaussian sources. Moreover, we note that gives us the minimum mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper when the legitimate user wants to reconstruct the source within a fixed distortion constraint while there is no concern on the transmission rate . Denoting the minimum mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper when the legitimate user needs to reconstruct the source within a fixed distortion constraint by , the corresponding result can be stated as follows. where . Theorem 5 implies that if the transmitter's aim is to minimize the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper without concerning itself with the rate it costs as long as the legitimate receiver is able to reconstruct the source within a distortion constraint , the use of jointly Gaussian is optimal. Since in Theorem 5, there is no rate constraint, one natural question to ask is whether can be achieved by an uncoded transmission scheme. Now, we address this question in a broader context by letting the encoder use any instantaneous encoding function in the form of where can be a deterministic or a stochastic mapping. When is chosen to be stochastic, we assume it to be independent across time. We note that the uncoded transmission can be obtained from instantaneous encoding by selecting to be a linear function. Similarly, uncoded transmission with artificial noise can be obtained from instantaneous encoding by selecting , where denotes the noise. Hence, if the encoder uses an instantaneous encoding scheme, the transmitted signal is given by . Let be the minimum information leakage to the eavesdropper when the legitimate user is able to reconstruct the source with a distortion constraint while the encoder uses an instantaneous encoding. The following example demonstrates that, in general, cannot be achieved by instantaneous encoding. Example 1: Consider the scalar case, where the side information at the legitimate user and the eavesdropper are given as follows:
where , and are zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances , and , respectively. , and are independent. We assume that , which implies that we can assume since the scalar model in (36)-(37) is statistically degraded, or in other words, the correlation between and does not affect the achievable region. Using Theorem 3, for the scalar Gaussian channel under consideration can be found as follows:
where in (39), we used the Markov chain . As shown in Appendix A, the information leakage to the eavesdropper when the encoder uses an instantaneous mapping is given by
where (41) This example shows that an uncoded transmission is not optimal even when there is no rate constraint. This is due to the presence of an eavesdropper; the presence of an eavesdropper necessitates the use of a coded scheme.
Another question that Theorem 5 brings about is whether the minimum in (35) is achieved by a nontrivial . By a trivial selection for , we mean either or . The former corresponds to the selection and the latter corresponds to the selection . We note that although (35) is monotonically decreasing in in the positive semidefinite sense, (35) is neither monotonically increasing nor monotonically decreasing in in the positive semidefinite sense. Hence, due to this lack of monotonicity of (35) in , in general, we expect that both and may be necessary to attain the minimum in (35). The following example demonstrates that in general and may be necessary.
Example 2: Consider the Gaussian source where and are independent. The side information at the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper are given by
where and are zero-mean Gaussian random variables with variances and , respectively. Moreover, and are independent, and also so are and . We assume that noise variances satisfy (48) (49) which, in view of the fact that correlation between the noise at the legitimate receiver and the noise at the eavesdropper does not affect the rate, distortion, and information leakage region, lets us assume the following Markov chains:
Moreover, we assume that the distortion constraint is a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries and . In this case, the minimum information leakage is given by (52) whose proof can be found in Appendix C. The minimum information leakage in (52) corresponds the selections and , where and are independent. This selection of corresponds to neither nor . Next, we obtain the minimum information leakage that arises when we set either or , and show that the minimum information leakage arising from these selections are strictly larger than the minimum information leakage in (52), which will imply the suboptimality of and . When we set , the minimum information leakage is given by (53) whose proof is given in Appendix D. When we set , the minimum information leakage is given by (54) whose proof can be found in Appendix D. Now, we compare the minimum information leakage in (52) with (53) is suboptimal. Example 2 shows that, in general, we might need two covariance matrices, and hence two different auxiliary random variables, to attain the minimum information leakage. Indeed, if we have either or , the corresponding achievable scheme is identical to the Wyner-Ziv scheme [17] . Hence, the necessity of two different auxiliary random variables implies that, in general, Wyner-Ziv scheme [17] is suboptimal.
IV. PROOF OF THEOREM 4
We now provide the proof of Theorem 4. As mentioned in the previous section, this outer bound is obtained by minimizing the rate constraint in (24) and the mutual information leakage constraint in (25) separately. We first consider the rate constraint in (24) as follows:
where (70) comes from the fact that is maximized by jointly Gaussian , and (71) comes from the monotonicity of in positive semidefinite matrices. Now we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 2:
(72)
The proof of Lemma 2 is given in Appendix E. Lemma 2 and (71) imply (29).
Next, we consider the mutual information leakage constraint in (25) as follows:
We note that the cost function of can be rewritten as follows:
where (75) comes from the Markov chain and (76) comes from the Markov chain . We note that the first term in (76) is minimized by a jointly Gaussian as we already showed in obtaining the lower bound for the rate given by (29) above in (67)-(71). On the other hand, the remaining term of (76) in the bracket is maximized by a jointly Gaussian as shown in [18] . Thus, a tension between these two terms arises if is selected to be jointly Gaussian. In spite of this tension, we will still show that a jointly Gaussian is the minimizer of . Instead of directly showing this, we first characterize the minimum mutual information leakage when is restricted to be jointly Gaussian, and show that this cannot be attained by any other distribution for . We note that any jointly Gaussian can be written as (77) (78) where are zero-mean Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices , respectively. Moreover, are independent of but can be dependent on each other. Before characterizing the minimum mutual information leakage when is restricted to be jointly Gaussian, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 3: When and is Gaussian, we have the following facts:
1) , i.e., is positive definite, and hence, nonsingular.
2) We have the following equivalence:
The proof of Lemma 3 is given in Appendix F. Using Lemma 3, the minimum mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper when is restricted to be jointly Gaussian can be written as follows:
(80) We note that the minimization in (80) can be written as a minimization of the cost function in (80) over all possible matrices by expressing and in terms of . Instead of considering this tedious optimization problem, we consider the following one:
We note that due to the Markov chain , we always have
. A proof of this fact is given in Appendix G. Besides this inequality, and might have further interdependencies which are not considered in the optimization problem in (81). Since neglecting these further interdependencies among and enlarges the feasible set of the optimization problem in (80), we have, in general,
On the other hand, it can be shown that the value of can be obtained by some jointly Gaussian satisfying the Markov chain , as stated in the following lemma. Lemma 4:
The proof of Lemma 4 is given in Appendix H. Now we study the optimization problem in (81) in more detail. Let and be the minimizers for the optimization problem . They need to satisfy the following KKT conditions. 
for some positive semidefinite matrices . The proof of Lemma 5 is given in Appendix I.
Next, we use channel enhancement [19] . In particular, we enhance the legitimate user's side information as follows:
This new covariance matrix has some useful properties which are listed in the following lemma.
Lemma 6: We have the following facts. 1
. The proof of Lemma 6 is given in Appendix J. Using this new covariance , we define the enhanced side information at the legitimate user as follows: (90) where is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix . Since we have and as stated in the second statement of Lemma 6, without loss of generality, we can assume that the following Markov chain exists:
Assuming that the Markov chain in (91) exists does not incur any loss of generality because the rate, mutual information leakage, and distortion region depends only on the conditional marginal distributions but not on the conditional joint distribution . Now, we define the following optimization problem:
(92) We note that we have due to the Markov chain in (91), which leads to the following fact:
Moreover, unlike the original optimization problem in (74), we can find the minimizer of the new optimization problem explicitly, as stated in the following lemma. Lemma 7:
(94) We note that Lemma 7 implies that and a Gaussian leading to is the minimizer of the optimization problem . The proof of Lemma 7 is given in Appendix K.
Next, we show that indeed which, in view of (93), will imply . To this end, using Lemma where (96) comes from the last statement of Lemma 6, (97) follows from the fifth statement of Lemma 6, and (98) comes from the fourth statement of Lemma 6. In view of (93), (100) implies that ; completing the proof of Theorem 4 as well as the proof of Theorem 5 due to the fact that .
V. GENERAL CASE
We now consider the general case where the side information are given by (101)
where without loss of generality, we can assume that the covariance matrices of Gaussian vectors and are given by identity matrices. We denote the singular value decomposition of and by and , respectively. Since any invertible transformation applied to the side information does not change the rate, information leakage, and distortion region, the side information given by (101)-(102) and the side information obtained by multiplying (101)-(102) by , respectively, yield the same rate, information leakage, and distortion region. In other words, the side information given by (101)-(102) and the side information given by
yield the same rate, information leakage, and distortion region, where the covariance matrices of are given by identity matrices. Next, we claim that there is no loss of generality to assume that the side information and have the same length as the source . To this end, assume that the length of is smaller than the length of . In this case, simply, we can concatenate with some zero vector to ensure that both and have the same length. Next, assume that the length of is larger than the length of . In this case, will definitely have at least diagonal elements which are zero, and hence the corresponding entries in will come from only the noise. Since noise components are independent, dropping these elements of does not change the rate, information leakage, and distortion region. Thus, without loss of generality, we can assume that , and hence without loss of generality, we can assume that is a square matrix. The same argument applies to the eavesdropper's side information, and hence, without loss of generality, we can also assume that is a square matrix. Next, we define the following side information:
where
. We note that and are invertible matrices. Since multiplying the side information in (105)-(102) by some invertible matrices does not change the rate, information leakage, and distortion region, the side information in (105)-(106) and the following side information:
have the same rate, information leakage, and distortion region, where the covariance matrices of and are given by
respectively. For a given distortion constraint , we denote the rate and information leakage region for the side information model given in (101)-(102) by , where the subscript stands for the "original system," and for the side information model given in (107)-(108) by . We have the following relationship between and . Lemma 8:
The proof of Lemma 8 is given in Appendix L. Next, using Theorem 4, we obtain an outer bound for the region , where this outer bound also serves as an outer bound for the region due to Lemma 8. The corresponding result is stated in the following theorem. 
where . The proof of Theorem 6 is given in Appendix M. We prove Theorem 6 in two steps. In the first step, by using Theorem 4, we obtain an outer bound for the region , and in the second step, we obtain the limit of this outer bound as . As the outer bound in Theorem 6 basically comes from the outer bound in Theorem 4, all our previous comments and remarks about Theorem 4 are also valid for the outer bound in Theorem 6. Similar to Theorem 4, Theorem 6 also provides the minimum information leakage to the eavesdropper when the rate constraint on the transmitter is removed. Denoting the corresponding minimum information leakage by , we have the following theorem.
Theorem 7: If , we have (114) where . As Theorem 7 basically comes from Theorem 5, all our previous comments and remarks about Theorem 5 are also valid for Theorem 7.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study secure lossy source coding for vector Gaussian sources, where the transmitter sends information about the source in a way that the legitimate user can reconstruct the source within a distortion level by using its side information. Meanwhile, the transmitter wants to keep the mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper to a minimum, where the eavesdropper also has a side information about the source. We obtain an outer bound for the achievable rate, mutual information leakage, and distortion region. Moreover, we obtain the minimum mutual information leakage to the eavesdropper when the legitimate user needs to reconstruct the source within a certain distortion while there is no constraint on the transmission rate.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF (40)
We first define the following function:
(115) which is monotonically decreasing, continuous, and convex in . Next, we note that when an instantaneous encoding scheme is used, the minimum-mean-square-error estimator is given by (116) (117) where (117) comes from the independence of across time. Consequently, when an instantaneous encoding scheme is used, the minimum-mean-square-error is given by (118) Assume that there exists an instantaneous encoding scheme that achieves the distortion level :
We now obtain a lower bound for the minimum information leakage for this instantaneous encoding scheme as follows: 
where (121) comes from the independence of across time, (122) follows by setting , (123) comes from the definition of , (124) is due to the convexity of in , (125) follows from the fact that is continuous in , and (126) comes from (119) and the fact that is monotonically decreasing in .
APPENDIX B PROOF OF LEMMA 1
We first introduce two lemmas that will be used in the proof of Lemma 1. In this appendix, we use notation to denote " and are independent" to shorten the presentation.
Lemma 9: Let be arbitrary random variables. If we have the Markov chain and . Then, we have . Proof: Since a set of random variables is independent iff their joint characteristic function is the product of their individual characteristic functions, to prove Lemma 9, it is sufficient to show the following: Lemma 10: Let be random variables satisfying and . Then, we have . Proof: Similar to the proof of Lemma 9, here also we use the fact that a set of random variables is independent iff their joint characteristic function is the product of their individual characteristic functions. We now prove Lemma 1. We note that we have iff the Markov chain holds. We prove by contradiction that when , the Markov chain is not possible. To this end, we note that the side information at the eavesdropper can be written as (140) or in other words, we have where is a Gaussian random variable independent of with variance . Next, we note that the Markov chain implies in view of Lemma 9. Since are jointly Gaussian, can be written as 
APPENDIX C PROOF OF (52)
Here, we provide the proof of (52). To this end, we consider a slightly more general case where the joint distribution of the source and side information is given by (144) and the distortion constraint is imposed with a diagonal matrix whose diagonal entries are denoted by . From Theorem 3, the minimum information leakage is given by (145) We first introduce the following auxiliary random variables: where (159) follows from the fact that conditioning reduces MMSE (see Appendix G for a proof), (160) comes from the following Markov chain:
which is a consequence of (144) and the Markov chain , and (161) is due to the definition of given in (147). Hence, (158) implies that when the joint distribution of the source and side information can be factorized as in (144), the minimum information leakage is given by (163) We now specialize (163) 
Plugging (170) and (171) into (166), we obtain the desired result in (52); completing the proof.
APPENDIX D PROOFS OF (53) AND (54)
We first prove (53). To this end, we note that when the joint distribution of the source and side information is given by (172) and the distortion constraint is imposed by a diagonal matrix with diagonal entries , the minimum information leakage is given by (173) as shown in Appendix C (in particular, see (163)). When we set , in other words, when we set , (173) reduces to (174) which is the desired result in (53).
Next, we prove (54) by using (173 where (197) follows from (193). Thus, using (197), the constraint can be expressed as follows: (198) from which, since , the following order can be obtained: (199) which completes the proof of Lemma 3.
APPENDIX G CONDITIONING REDUCES MMSE
Here, we prove that conditioning reduces MMSE. To this end, we introduce the following lemma.
Lemma 13: Let and be any two -dimensional random vectors and . Then,
Proof: The proof of this lemma comes from the fact given in (182)-(183), at the bottom of this page.
We now prove the fact that conditioning reduces MMSE. . Hence, we have . Next, we show that to complete the proof of Lemma 4. To do so, we need to show that for any jointly Gaussian with conditional covariance matrices and satisfying and , there exists another jointly Gaussian pair such that this pair has the following properties:
. 3)
. To this end, we note that can be represented as
where and are independent, are zeromean Gaussian random vectors with identity covariance matrices. The cross covariance of and is given by , which needs to be selected accordingly to ensure that we have the following Markov chain:
The conditional covariance is given by [20, p. 155] (209)
Since we are seeking a such that , we set in (209) yielding
which is equivalent to (212) Next, we note the Woodbury matrix identity [22] . Lemma 15 ([22, p. 17] ): then, we also have . Next, we will explicitly construct and matrices to satisfy (222) and (223), respectively. To this end, we introduce the following lemma, which will be used subsequently. We also note the following:
since . Now, we are ready to show that and satisfy the Markov chain by specifying . We set as follows:
where is a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix , and is independent of . In view of (237), we have (238) (239) (240) which implies that satisfy the Markov chain ; completing the proof.
APPENDIX I PROOF OF LEMMA 5
The Lagrangian for the optimization problem is given as follows:
where the positive semidefinite matrices are the Lagrange multipliers for the following constraints: We first note that we have , otherwise . Hence, using the fact that if , , and (248), we obtain . Next, using the fact that in (246), we obtain the KKT condition given in (84). Equation (247) implies (85). Finally, using the fact that , in (249)-(251), we can obtain the KKT conditions given in (86)-(88), respectively.
APPENDIX J PROOF OF LEMMA 6
We start with the second statement of the lemma. To this end, we note that (85) and (89) imply the following:
Next, using the fact that if , and , we have in conjunction with the fact that , we can obtain the second statement of the lemma from (252)-(253).
Next, we consider the third statement of the lemma as follows: 
where (269) comes from (253) and (270) is due to (88). Now, we prove the last statement of the lemma. To this end, we note that the third statement of this lemma and (84) imply the following: Finally, we note that (272) also implies the first statement of the lemma; completing the proof.
APPENDIX K PROOF OF LEMMA 7
A) Background: We need some properties of the Fisher information and the differential entropy, which are provided next.
Definition 1 ([24, Definition 3]):
Let be an arbitrarily correlated length-random vector pair with well-defined densities. The conditional Fisher information matrix of given is defined as
where the expectation is over the joint density , and the conditional score function is (278) We first present the conditional form of the Cramer-Rao inequality, which is proved in [24] . Lemma 17 ([24, Lemma 13] ): Let be arbitrarily correlated random vectors with well-defined densities. Let the conditional covariance matrix of be , then we have (279) which is satisfied with equality if is jointly Gaussian with conditional covariance matrix . The following lemma will be used in the upcoming proof. The unconditional version of this lemma, i.e., the case , is proved in [24, Lemma 6] . Lemma 18 ([24, Lemma 6] ): Let be random vectors such that and are independent. Moreover, let be Gaussian random vectors with covariance matrices such that . Then, we have (280)
The following lemma will also be used in the upcoming proof. Lemma 19 ([24, Lemma 8] ): Let be positive semidefinite matrices satisfying , and be a matrix-valued function such that for . Moreover, is assumed to be gradient of a scalar field. Then, we have (281)
The following generalization of the de Bruijn identity [25] , [26] is due to [27] , where the unconditional form of this identity, i.e., , is proved. Its generalization to this conditional form for an arbitrary is rather straightforward, and is given in [24, Lemma 16] . Lemma 20 ([24, Lemma 16] ): Let be an arbitrarily correlated random vector pair with finite second order moments, and also be independent of the random vector which is zeromean Gaussian with covariance matrix . Then, we have (282)
The following lemma provides a connection between the conditional covariance matrix and the Fisher information matrices of a random vector.
Lemma 21: Let be two arbitrary random vectors with finite second moments, and be a zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix . Let . Assume and are independent. We have (283)
Lemma 21 is proved in [27] for . Its generalization to the current conditional form can be obtained by using the conditional Fisher information and Lemma 20. Hence, (288) and (290) imply the following:
where (292) comes from the Markov chain . We note that the optimization problem in (292) is similar to the one we already studied in (67)-(71). Indeed, if the constraint in (292) was , both optimization problems would be identical, and using the analysis in (67)-(71), we could conclude that (292) is minimized by a Gaussian satisfying . However, the difference between these two constraints necessitates a new proof, and indeed, showing the optimality of Gaussian for the optimization problem in (292) is not as straightforward as showing the optimality of Gaussian for the optimization problem in (67).
We find the minimizer for the optimization problem in two steps. In the first step, for a given feasible , we explicitly construct a feasible Gaussian which provides the same value for the cost function of as the original does. Thus, this first step implies that restricting to be Gaussian does not change the optimum value of the optimization problem . Consequently, in the second step of the proof, we minimize over all feasible Gaussian . To this end, we note that the cost function of the optimization problem can be written as (293) for some constant , which is independent of . From now on, we focus on the difference of the two differential entropy terms in (293). Next, we note that using Lemma 20, we have (294) where is zero-mean Gaussian random vector with covariance matrix satisfying . Next, we find upper and lower bounds for (294). We note that Lemma 18 implies the following upper bound for :
Using (295) Now, we rewrite the bounds in (296) and (299). To this end, we define the following function:
where the matrix is given as follows:
(301) Hence, using in (300), the bounds in (296) is monotonically decreasing in the positive semidefinite matrices ; completing the proof of Lemma 7.
APPENDIX L PROOF OF LEMMA 8
We note that due to Theorem 3, we already have single-letter descriptions for the regions and . Thus, to prove Lemma 8, it suffices to show that for any given feasible , these two regions satisfy the relationship given in Lemma 8. We first note the following Markov chains:
Next, we show that any feasible for the region is also feasible for the region . To this end, we note that (321) 
where (337) comes from the continuity of the determinant in positive semidefinite matrices. Equation (339) implies that any achievable information leakage in the region is also inside the region ; completing the proof of Lemma 8.
APPENDIX M PROOF OF THEOREM 6
We start the proof of Theorem 6 by first expressing Theorem 4 for the side information model given by (107)-(108). In other words, we first provide an outer bound for the region by using Theorem 4. To this end, to be able to use Theorem 4, we need . However, since we originally have and , where the latter one follows from the Markov chain and the fact that conditioning reduces MMSE, might be indefinite. However, the only place we use the condition is to be able to show the equivalence between and for Gaussian in Lemma 3. In particular, we only need the fact that is nonsingular to show this equivalence, and which is implied by . However, still there might be distortion matrices for which although we have nonsingular , the condition is not satisfied. 
where . We now find the limiting region that comes from the one described by (349)-(350) as . To this end, we introduce the following lemma that will be used subsequently.
Lemma 22:
The proof of Lemma 22 is given in Appendix N.
We first consider the rate bound in (349) as follows: 
Following a similar analysis, the limit of the information leakage in (350) can be found as (363) which implies that any information leakage inside the region should be larger than (363); completing the proof of Theorem 6.
APPENDIX N PROOF OF LEMMA 22
We first prove the following lemma which will be used subsequently. 
